Game theoretic example derived from a frightening game allegedly played by Los Angeles teenagers. The two players drive cars straight at each other. They will crash fatally if neither swerves. If one swerves, he is ‘chicken’ and loses face, while the other can triumph and gloat over him. If each swerves, neither wins any kudos, but each survives. The options can be represented in a matrix:

This differs from the more famous prisoners’ dilemma, in that the outcome of both driving on is collectively and individually the worst, whereas in the prisoners’ dilemma the worst outcome for an individual is to stay quiet while the other confesses. In his Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (1959) Bertrand Russell compared the ‘mutually assured destruction’ of the nuclear deterrent to this game: ‘As played by irresponsible boys, this game is considered decadent and immoral, though only the lives of the players are risked. But when the game is played by eminent statesmen, who risk not only their own lives but those of many hundreds of millions of human beings, it is thought on both sides that the statesmen on one side are displaying a high degree of wisdom and courage, and only the statesmen on the other side are reprehensible.’