“truth conditions”的概念、定义、翻译、参考文献-科学参考

truth conditions

Logic

For a sentence $φ$ , the conditions that characterize those occasions in which $φ$ is true. When considering truth in an absolute sense, the truth condition for $φ$ corresponds to the conditions that the world satisfies precisely when $φ$ is true. When one considers a restricted notion of truth, such as the truth of a sentence in a model $M$ , the truth condition of a formula $φ$ describes what properties $M$ must satisfy when $φ$ is true in $M$ . Familiar model theoretic examples of truth conditions drawn from first-order classical logic include:
- • The atomic formula $R t_{0}, . . ., t_{n - 1}$ is true in $M$ when the $n$ -tuple of elements that $M$ assigns to $〈 t_{0}, . . ., t_{n - 1} 〉$ is a member of the set of $n$ -tuples $M$ assigns to $R$
- • A negated formula $\neg φ$ is true in $M$ precisely when $φ$ is not true in $M$
- • A conjunction $φ \land ψ$ is true in $M$ when each conjunct is true in $M$ .

Philosophy

The truth condition of a statement is the condition the world must meet if the statement is to be true. To know this condition is equivalent to knowing the meaning of the statement. Although this sounds as if it gives a solid anchorage for meaning, some of the security disappears when it turns out that the truth condition can only be defined by repeating the very same statement: the truth condition of ‘snow is white’ is that snow is white; the truth condition of ‘Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded’ is that Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded. It is disputed whether this element of running-on-the-spot disqualifies truth conditions from playing the central role in a substantive theory of meaning. Truth-conditional theories of meaning are sometimes opposed by the view that to know the meaning of a statement is to be able to use it in a network of inferences. See inferential role semantics.

单词	truth conditions
释义	truth conditions Logic For a sentence $φ$ , the conditions that characterize those occasions in which $φ$ is true. When considering truth in an absolute sense, the truth condition for $φ$ corresponds to the conditions that the world satisfies precisely when $φ$ is true. When one considers a restricted notion of truth, such as the truth of a sentence in a model $M$ , the truth condition of a formula $φ$ describes what properties $M$ must satisfy when $φ$ is true in $M$ . Familiar model theoretic examples of truth conditions drawn from first-order classical logic include: • The atomic formula $R t_{0}, . . ., t_{n - 1}$ is true in $M$ when the $n$ -tuple of elements that $M$ assigns to $〈 t_{0}, . . ., t_{n - 1} 〉$ is a member of the set of $n$ -tuples $M$ assigns to $R$ • A negated formula $\neg φ$ is true in $M$ precisely when $φ$ is not true in $M$ • A conjunction $φ \land ψ$ is true in $M$ when each conjunct is true in $M$ . Philosophy The truth condition of a statement is the condition the world must meet if the statement is to be true. To know this condition is equivalent to knowing the meaning of the statement. Although this sounds as if it gives a solid anchorage for meaning, some of the security disappears when it turns out that the truth condition can only be defined by repeating the very same statement: the truth condition of ‘snow is white’ is that snow is white; the truth condition of ‘Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded’ is that Britain would have capitulated had Hitler invaded. It is disputed whether this element of running-on-the-spot disqualifies truth conditions from playing the central role in a substantive theory of meaning. Truth-conditional theories of meaning are sometimes opposed by the view that to know the meaning of a statement is to be able to use it in a network of inferences. See inferential role semantics.
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