1. A property holding of any deductive system with a modal operator that is not normal, that is, a modal logic for which either rule necessitation fails or an instance of the axiom scheme:
fails.
2. In Kripke semantics for modal logics, describes a type of world at which formulae are evaluated in an unusual (and perhaps counterintuitive) fashion. Normal worlds are defined as possible worlds at which formulae of the form receive the familiar, Leibnizian truth condition:
Modal formulae have different truth conditions at non-normal worlds. Thus, in the semantics for the Lewis systems and a non-normal world is one at which formulae of the form are evaluated by the truth condition:
Non-normal worlds are employed in semantics for non-normal modal logics, explaining their pathological nature. Semantics for many non-normal logics must provide models serving as counterexamples to rule necessitation. Hence, the possible worlds framework requires a type of world at which can fail for some -theorem . Other deductive systems require further deviations from the evaluation of formulae at normal worlds; hence, other related devices, such as impossible worlds and the absurd world, are often referred to as ‘non-normal’.