One might just discover that one has an intention to do something (perhaps to one’s surprise) but often the formation of an intention ends, at least temporarily, a process of deciding what to do. To have an intention is to be in a state of mind that is favourably directed towards bringing about (or maintaining, or avoiding) some state of affairs, but which is not a mere desire or wish, since it also sets the subject on a course to bring that state of affairs about. The notion inherits all the problems of intentionality. The specific problems it raises include characterizing the difference between doing something accidentally and doing it intentionally. The suggestion that the difference lies in a preceding act of mind or volition is not very happy, since one may automatically do what is nevertheless intentional, for example putting one’s foot forward while walking. Conversely, unless the formation of a volition is intentional, and thus raises the same questions, since the presence of a volition might be unintentional or beyond one’s control. Intentions are more finely grained than movements: one set of movements may both be answering the question and starting a war, yet the one may be intentional and the other not.